Question 1

What makes §240 different from every other negligence law in America?

Accepted Answer

New York Labor Law §240(1) is unique in American jurisprudence because it imposes absolute, non-delegable strict liability on property owners and general contractors for gravity-related injuries. In every other state and in federal court, an injured worker must prove the defendant was negligent — that is, that the defendant failed to act as a reasonable person would. Under §240, you need only show that the work involved an elevation-related risk, that adequate protective devices were not provided or were defective, and that this failure was a proximate cause of your injuries. Comparative fault by the worker is not a defense. No other jurisdiction in the United States goes this far in protecting construction workers.

Question 2

Does §240 apply to renovation and repair work, not just new construction?

Accepted Answer

Yes. The statute expressly covers 'erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure.' Courts have broadly interpreted these terms, and the Court of Appeals has held that repair and renovation work — not just ground-up new construction — falls squarely within the statute. A worker remodeling a kitchen, replacing windows, or waterproofing a parking garage is as protected as a worker erecting a steel frame. The critical question is whether the task is 'construction work' directed at the building itself, as opposed to routine maintenance that happens to involve a ladder.

Question 3

What is the 'elevation differential' requirement in §240 cases?

Accepted Answer

Section 240(1) was enacted specifically to address the 'special hazards' of working at heights, so courts require that the injury involve a physically significant elevation differential. A worker who falls off a scaffold twenty feet above a floor clearly satisfies the requirement. But courts have dismissed §240 claims where the height difference was de minimis — a trip over a tool on a level surface, for example. The Court of Appeals in Runner v. New York Stock Exchange articulated that what matters is whether the harm flows directly from the application of the force of gravity to a person or object, not just the vertical distance involved. Falling object cases require that the object was in the process of being hoisted or secured, or otherwise fell because of the absence of an adequate safety device.

Question 4

Can a demolition worker claim §240 protection?

Accepted Answer

Absolutely. Demolition is explicitly enumerated in the text of §240(1), alongside erection, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning, and pointing. Courts have consistently held that workers engaged in tearing down buildings, removing structural elements, or clearing a site are protected by the statute to the same degree as those engaged in construction. Demolition work often involves the same elevated surfaces, scaffolding, and falling-object hazards that the Scaffold Law was designed to address, and property owners and general contractors owe the same non-delegable duty to these workers.

Question 5

Does §240 apply to workers on the ground hit by falling objects?

Accepted Answer

Yes, and this is one of the most important and frequently overlooked applications of the statute. Section 240(1) covers not only falls from height, but also injuries caused by falling objects — materials, tools, debris, or equipment that come down from an elevated location and strike a worker below. To succeed, the worker must show that the object was being hoisted or secured at the time, or that the risk of it falling was foreseeable and that an adequate safety device — such as overhead netting, toe boards, or secured containers — was not provided. The elevation differential still matters: an object falling from floor level does not trigger §240, but one falling from a scaffold, an upper story, or the forks of a forklift does.

Question 6

Who exactly counts as a 'property owner' for §240 purposes?

Accepted Answer

The statute imposes liability on 'owners of property' — a category courts have interpreted broadly. It includes the fee owner of a building or parcel, but also out-of-possession owners who have contracted for construction work, and entities that retain the right to control access to or supervise the worksite. In Abbatiello v. Lancaster Studio Associates, the Court of Appeals made clear that an owner does not escape liability simply by delegating safety responsibilities to a contractor. Lenders who have taken title at a foreclosure, government entities that own public structures, and real estate holding companies that technically own the property through an LLC all qualify as 'owners' for §240 purposes.

Question 7

Can a tenant be liable under §240 for work at their leased property?

Accepted Answer

Yes, in certain circumstances. New York courts have held that a tenant who contracts for construction work at a leased premises can be treated as an 'owner' for §240 liability purposes, even though the tenant does not hold title to the property. The key factors are whether the tenant directed, contracted for, or exercised supervisory control over the work. A commercial tenant who hires a contractor to build out its office space and retains authority over the work can be held fully liable under §240 for injuries sustained during that build-out, even though the landlord owns the building.

Question 8

What is the 'sole proximate cause' defense and how do defendants use it?

Accepted Answer

The sole proximate cause defense is the primary weapon defendants use in §240 cases to escape strict liability. It applies when the plaintiff's own conduct — not the absence of a safety device — was the sole cause of the accident. For example, if a scaffold with functioning guardrails was provided but the worker deliberately bypassed them for no legitimate work reason, a jury could find that the worker's own recklessness was the sole proximate cause of the fall. Critically, however, the defense does not apply simply because the worker was also negligent; under the strict liability framework, contributory negligence is not a defense. The sole proximate cause defense succeeds only when the provided safety equipment was adequate and the worker's unilateral refusal to use it was the only reason the accident happened.

Question 9

What if the safety device was provided but I chose not to use it?

Accepted Answer

This goes to the heart of the sole proximate cause defense. If a harness was provided, the harness was adequate for the task, and a proper anchor point was available, but you chose not to clip in, defendants will argue your decision was the sole proximate cause of your injuries. Courts examine whether the worker was instructed to use the device, whether the anchor point was actually accessible from the work location, and whether the device was functionally adequate for the specific job. In many cases, workers can establish that the harness lacked a sufficient anchor, was the wrong type, or that they were never told to use it — shifting liability back to the owner or contractor. These fact-specific issues typically go to the jury.

Question 10

Can a general contractor be liable even if they weren't on site?

Accepted Answer

Yes. The duty imposed by §240(1) is non-delegable, meaning a general contractor cannot escape liability by pointing to a subcontractor and arguing it had no direct supervision over the work at the moment of the accident. Courts in New York have consistently held that a general contractor's absence from the site at the time of the accident does not extinguish its statutory obligation. What matters is that the general contractor was responsible for coordinating and overseeing the project, had the authority to direct safety at the site, and failed to ensure adequate protective devices were in place. This makes general contractors — and their insurance carriers — key defendants in virtually every §240 case.

Question 11

Does §240 apply to painting and window cleaning?

Accepted Answer

Yes. The statute expressly names 'painting' and 'cleaning' as covered activities, and courts have applied it to interior and exterior painting as well as window washing on elevated structures. A painter working on a ladder or scaffold who falls, or who is struck by a falling can of paint or equipment, has a cognizable §240 claim. Window washers working from rope-suspended equipment or scaffolds outside a high-rise building are similarly protected. Courts have, however, distinguished routine cleaning — such as mopping a floor or cleaning a store's glass doors from the inside — from the type of 'cleaning' contemplated by the statute, which involves working at elevation on a building.

Question 12

What is the difference between §240 and §241(6) claims?

Accepted Answer

Labor Law §240(1) imposes strict liability and requires only that there was an elevation-related accident and that adequate safety devices were not provided — no specific regulation needs to be violated. Labor Law §241(6), by contrast, requires the plaintiff to identify a specific, concrete Industrial Code provision that was violated and that the violation was a proximate cause of the injury. Section 241(6) also does not carry strict liability in the same absolute sense; it is more analogous to a negligence per se claim. However, §241(6) covers a broader range of accidents — including non-elevation hazards like caught-between injuries — and can be brought alongside a §240 claim when the facts support both theories.

Question 13

Can I bring both §240 and §241(6) claims in the same lawsuit?

Accepted Answer

Yes, and doing so is standard practice in well-pleaded construction accident complaints. Attorneys routinely plead §240(1) for the elevation-related aspects of an accident and layer in §241(6) claims based on applicable Industrial Code violations — such as 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (hazardous conditions), 23-1.16 (safety harnesses), or 23-5.1 (scaffolding requirements). The two claims are not mutually exclusive, and courts regularly allow both to proceed to summary judgment. Even if §240 is dismissed on a particular fact pattern, a well-pleaded §241(6) claim can survive independently and give the plaintiff another avenue to recovery.

Question 14

What if I was a delivery worker, not a construction worker?

Accepted Answer

Delivery workers are generally not covered by §240 because they are not engaged in construction, demolition, repair, alteration, painting, cleaning, or pointing of a building. The statute protects workers performing those enumerated activities, not anyone who happens to enter a construction site or a building under renovation. However, if a delivery worker is injured on a site where active construction is underway — particularly if they were directed by the owner or contractor into an area of known hazard — they may have claims under Labor Law §200 (general duty to maintain a safe workplace) or common law negligence. An attorney should evaluate the specific circumstances.

Question 15

Does §240 apply to roof repair on a residential home?

Accepted Answer

It depends on whether the homeowner exemption applies. Section 240 contains an exemption for owners of one- and two-family dwellings who contract for work but do not direct or control the labor. The exemption was designed to protect unsophisticated homeowners who hire contractors and have no meaningful control over how the work is performed. Courts have held, however, that if the homeowner directed the specific work being done — even informally, by telling workers where to walk or what to fix — the exemption does not apply. Additionally, the exemption applies only to one- and two-family homes; any residential building with three or more units falls outside the exemption and triggers full §240 liability.

Question 16

What Industrial Code violations most commonly support §241(6) alongside §240?

Accepted Answer

In practice, 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(b)(1) (protection from falling into hazardous openings), 23-1.7(e)(1) (tripping hazards in passageways), 23-1.16 (safety harnesses and lifelines), 23-5.1 (general scaffold requirements), and 23-5.3 (wood pole scaffolds) are among the most frequently cited in construction accident litigation. Courts scrutinize whether the regulation is sufficiently specific — a regulation requiring 'adequate' protection has been held too general, while one specifying plank thickness or guardrail height passes muster. Your attorney will identify every applicable Industrial Code section based on the type of accident, the equipment involved, and the specific work being performed.

Question 17

Can a union safety officer's failure to flag a violation affect my §240 case?

Accepted Answer

Not directly, as a defense to your §240 claim. The duty to provide adequate safety devices under §240 rests on the property owner and general contractor, not the union or union safety officers. A safety officer's failure to note a hazard does not transfer liability to the union or away from the statutory defendants. However, if a union safety officer observed and documented a condition — or failed to do so — that evidence may be relevant to establishing notice, to demonstrating that the hazard existed for a period of time, or to the broader factual record of site conditions. Union records, inspection logs, and safety grievances can all be valuable discovery materials.

Question 18

What role does OSHA play in a §240 case?

Accepted Answer

OSHA investigations and citations are not binding on New York courts in a §240 action, but they are admissible and often powerfully persuasive. If OSHA cited the general contractor or site owner for a fall protection violation under 29 CFR 1926.502 after your accident, that citation is evidence that federal regulators found the same deficiency you are alleging in your civil case. The citation cannot be used as conclusive proof of liability, but it can corroborate your theory and impeach any witness who claims the site was fully compliant. OSHA inspection reports, photographs, and witness statements obtained during the investigation are obtainable through freedom of information requests and should be preserved immediately.

Question 19

Have New York courts ever refused to apply §240 to scaffold accidents?

Accepted Answer

Yes, on narrow grounds. Courts have dismissed §240 scaffold claims where the plaintiff failed to establish that the scaffold's defect was a proximate cause of the fall — for example, where the plaintiff admitted he lost his balance independently and would have fallen even if the scaffold had guardrails. Courts have also found against plaintiffs who could not establish they were engaged in covered work at the time of the accident, or where the scaffold was provided and functioned properly but the worker deliberately chose not to use it. These cases are the exception; the general trend of New York appellate decisions has been to apply §240 broadly in favor of injured workers. But the facts of each case matter, and that is why prompt legal counsel is important.

Question 20

What is the strongest evidence in a §240 scaffold accident case?

Accepted Answer

The strongest evidence typically includes: photographs of the accident scene taken immediately after the incident, showing the scaffold's condition, the absence of guardrails or other protective devices, and the area where the worker landed; OSHA inspection reports and citations; witness statements from coworkers who observed conditions before and after the accident; the worker's own detailed account of what happened and what safety equipment was and was not present; medical records documenting the injuries and linking them to the fall; and any accident reports generated by the employer or the general contractor. Expert testimony from a licensed engineer who can explain why the scaffold was defective under both OSHA standards and the New York Industrial Code can be critical at trial or to support a summary judgment motion on liability.

NY Labor Law §240 — The Scaffold Law: 20 Questions Answered

Labor Law §240(1) — The Scaffold Law

Related Questions

Ready to Talk About Your Case?